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INTRODUCTION
 The International Criminal Court was set up in order to dissuade state 
officials from participating in behaviors that are considered war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The U.S. is a major super power but not a pivotal 
character in the ICC institution. This fact has had negative effects on U.S. 
international policy. This paper explores first what the ICC is and how it came 
to be, and then addresses the weaknesses of the institution, U.S. relations with 
the ICC and how they effect U.S. international relations, and finally what policy 
changes need to be made in order to make the ICC more effective. 
THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE ICC
 The twentieth century was characterized as an era of impressive 
“judicialization” on an international scale.  Following the conclusion of the 
Cold War, many countries favored establishing courts in a rejuvenated endeavor 
to find solutions to international problems.  Such problems included severe 
civil wars throughout the world, conflicts arising from the disintegration of 
global stability previously maintained by the forty-year-long balance of power 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  It can be argued that “there is a 
widening consensus that the protection of human rights is a matter of collective 
international concern and a legitimate object of foreign policy.”1  
 A United Nations that was limited in its ability to prevent atrocities 
in Yugoslavia and then Rwanda chose to create ad hoc courts able to bring 
the perpetrators to justice.  The resulting Tribunals functioned as important 
precedents to the establishment of the International Criminal Court.2 On 
February 2nd 1999, Senegal became the first country to ratify the Rome Statue, 
the treaty creating the International Criminal Court. Nearly 160 states met to 
negotiate the final act for the proposed ICC. 120 states voted in favor, 7 against 
(including the United States), and 21 abstaining. The ICC came into being 
on July 2002 six months after the sixth state ratified the court’s statue into its 
national laws.3  
WHAT IS THE ICC?
 The ICC is a permanent and independent court. It was established by 
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governments, but it is not clearly in any given government’s interest. The Court 
has jurisdiction over all potential cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes that occur after July 2002 in the territory of a state that has 
ratified the Rome Statute or that are committed by a citizen of such a state.4 The 
crimes in the ICC’s statute are already established in international treaties and 
conventions and the statute therefore does not create new laws but establishes a 
new collective enforcement mechanism for already accepted universal norms.5  
ICC JURISDICTION
 The ICC does not allow states to decide whether or not to accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction on a case- by-case basis which is different than the previous 
International Court of Justice.6  The Rome Statute is set up the prosecutor’s 
office where the prosecutor has the ability to commence cases on her or his 
own initiative without relying solely on the referrals of states.7 In the past, the 
jurisdiction of ad hoc court systems like the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) targeted specific events and individual actions. The writers of the 
Rome Statute carefully included within the treaty the language to allow states 
to address “situations” that include entire spans of conflict, rather than limiting 
the references to individual cases of wrongdoing.8 The first step in approaching 
a state with a potential investigation is to allow their government first to 
administer their own judicial actions through domestic courts. If the procedures 
are thorough and accurate the ICC will not step in. However, if for any reason 
the ICC believes the domestic judicial practices are not adequate they then have 
the jurisdiction to step in and administer their own judicial policies. 
STATE OFFICIALS AND THE ICC
 The ICC does not recognize any of the immunities traditionally 
afforded to heads of state and other senior officials under international law. This 
includes the president, parliament members, and legislative members. The Rome 
Statute is very clear that all states bound by the treaty agree that their president, 
parliament members, or any other legislative officials can and will in fact be 
targeted for investigation; a threat each government has to weigh when deciding 
whether to ratify the statue.9  
WHY DO STATES JOIN THE ICC?
 If a state has to give up its own sovereignty in order to be a member of 
the ICC why would the states want to join? Power is something no state gives up 
willingly. Or do they? Danner and Simon argue there are two reasons why 
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a state decides to join the ICC. The first is that governments anticipate they 
will never be found in violation of ICC policy. This might point to the reason 
why the more peaceful Scandinavian countries jumped on board without any 
hesitation. The second easy answer is that governments expect to be able to use 
the ICC to legitimate the prosecution of their political opponents. This can be 
counter-intuitive considering the governments themselves are also vulnerable 
to prosecution by the ICC. However, this allows the governments in countries 
who will more likely find themselves in an ICC courtroom to demonstrate to the 
opposition within their state that the government is willing to go to such lengths 
to avert conflict that they are willing to even have themselves subjected to the 
court, giving the government legitimacy through accountability.10  
PROBLEMS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE ICC
I. Voluntary Participation
 The main problem remains, however, that even though states sign 
up to a large number of international laws to protect human rights, the laws’ 
enforcement is nevertheless dependent on voluntary state cooperation.11  The 
ICC does not have its own police department to enforce the laws that protect 
human rights.  It is the responsibility of the states to enforce sanctions, extradite 
suspects, and allow the ICC freedom to investigate. When the goals of the ICC 
conflict with states’ objectives, states will make things difficult for the ICC 
to carry out its objectives. Governments can interfere with prosecutions by 
strategically withholding evidence, interfering with investigations, and denying 
passports or visas to witnesses.12 
II. Management Problems
 Some of the weaknesses the ICC battles with are self-inflicted. The 
ICC operates in a complicated, sometimes hostile political environment within 
its own management team.  By early 2003, the leadership of the ICC was 
configured as a triumvirate consisting of the prosecutor, the court’s president 
or ceremonial head responsible for external relations, and the registrar or lead 
administrative officer.13  The main source of conflict between these offices has 
been the prosecutor, Moreno Ocamp, who has confronted the registrar in an 
attempt to prevent his bailiwick, or bailiff jurisdiction, from being raided.  He 
has also refused to coordinate with the president and has initiated fights over 
issues concerning witness protection and human resources. These conflicts have 
hindered the ICC’s legitimacy and slowed progress.  Furthermore, Ocampo’s 
former aids voiced complaints that his tendencies to micro manage and 
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his irregular modes of decision making were excessively eccentric. Many 
upstanding employees have already turned their two-week notice in, which has 
deprived the ICC of the exceptional minds it once had.13 
III. Prosecutorial Problems
 Perhaps the most demoralizing fact is that, to the frustrations of victims 
and dozens of governments who have contributed nearly a billion dollars to its 
budget since 2003, the ICC has yet to complete even a single trial.  Its first trial 
was nearly dismissed twice.  The suspect tried was Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
the Congolese Militia leader accused of recruiting children as soldiers.  In this 
case much criticism of Ocampo has been voiced for his failing to include sexual 
abuse charges, especially from individuals fighting gender discrimination in 
a country rampant with it.  However, Ocampo’s neglect does not stop there.  
During the trial, he was repeatedly witnessed focusing his attention on his 
Blackberry and did not even care to stay long enough to hear the defense’s 
conclusion.  On two occasions the judges were forced to order Luanga’s release, 
the result of serious concerns that the prosecution denied the defense a shared 
inspection of potentially exonerating evidence.  The prosecution also enraged 
judges by neglecting to fill out appropriate court documents hindering the 
prosecution’s ability to conduct a trial in good faith.14  
VI. Ocampo’s Bold Demonstrations Compromising Cases 
 Ocampo has also been criticized for his bold demonstrations and brash 
actions, which end up hindering the cases. For example the ICC had never 
charged a sitting head of state of genocide. In 2008 Ocampo requested that the 
judges issue a warrant for the arrest of Ahmad Harun (senior offical of Bashir’s 
Government), charging him with genocide in addition to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Due to the additional genocide charge it was eight months 
before the judges could make a decision on the crimes against humanity. It 
was an additional year and an appeal for the warrant for genocide to be issued; 
however, by this time the damage had been done. It was obvious to any defense 
team that the judges would struggle with internal dissent and public confidence 
if the genocide charge was undermined.  By trying to make bold demonstrations 
he compromised the case. The Sudanese government, which was already failing 
to participate with the ICC, went into lockdown. It proceeded to remove any 
humanitarian work within its borders and exhibited aggression towards domestic 
opposition.  The International Crisis group, though having been a strong 
supporter of the ICC, criticized Ocampo’s methods, claiming that he risked 
“politicizing his office” and that he took needlessly “confrontational” attitudes 
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with Bashir.  As a result, any progress on the Darfur case seems to have come to 
a complete halt.15 
V. International? Or just Africa?
 With all six of the ICC’s investigations taking place in Africa- The 
Central African Republic, Congo, Kenya, Libya, Sudan, and Uganda, the 
ICC’s reputation as a truly international tribunal is in question. The court has 
invited the charge that it is an agent for postcolonial Western interests. This 
is unfortunate because many atrocities do occur in Africa, and international 
attention should be encouraged, not shunned. The Prosecuting Office has 
conducted investigations outside of the African continent including Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Georgia, Honduras, and the Palestine territories, but Ocampo has 
not chosen to proceed in these territories.  With Columbia, there was sufficient 
evidence to begin thorough investigations of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by paramilitary offices with relations to government agencies.  The 
facts demanded investigation, and with Columbian courts appearing unlikely to 
accuse high ranking officials, the ICC was left alone to intercede but did not.16 
This gives Africa enough of a reason to suspect the ICC’s priorities are honed in 
on their homeland and avoiding contact with other ICC members states who are 
also in violation of ICC policy. 
 Jesse Helms predicted that “as long as there is a breath in me, The 
United States will never- and I repeat never, never- allow its national security 
decisions to be judged by an international criminal court.”16  The United States 
has always expressed its interest in an international court. The United States 
played an active role in the Nuremberg trails and also the creation of the UN 
ad hoc courts ICTY and ICTR. The United States attended all conferences that 
led up to the signing of the Rome Statue but when the day came the statue did 
not include acceptable protection measures the U.S. demanded it have in order 
to agree to it. Three presidential administrations have approached the ICC 
differently, approaches ranging from extreme hostility to cautious optimism. It 
is important to examine how these three administrations dealt with the ICC in 
order to determine what future U.S. policy should entail when dealing with the 
ICC. 
U.S.’S TWO MAIN OPPOSTIONS TO THE ICC
I. Article 12
 First let us look at the U.S.’s two main oppositions to the ICC. One, the 
Court’s jurisdiction as it is set out in Article 12 and Article 2, the fact that the 
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ICC is independent from the UN Security Council and does not recognize the 
“special” role that the United States plays as a major superpower in international 
relations. Article 12 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction if an offense 
is committed on a state party’s territory or if the accused is a national of an 
ICC member state. Therefore, if a U.S. national was accused of committing 
an ICC crime on a state party’s territory, the ICC could try him or her without 
the consent of the U.S. The U.S. argues this, in turn, gives the ICC universal 
jurisdiction, which is not customary in international law.17  As a result, however, 
the U.S. is unfortunately guilty of using a double standard.  It has signed other 
treaties that include provisions such as the Torture Convention, allowing and 
even requiring prosecution or extradition of alleged criminals, regardless of their 
nationality. It is evident “that there is no objection in principle to the idea of 
international courts”18  but that the objection is only related to an international 
court exercising criminal jurisdiction over Americans.19  
II. Great Power Responsibility 
 Even though the goals of the ICC in human rights are the same as those 
in the U.S., the U.S. is concerned that the independence and flexibility of its 
military forces will be threatened. Some people suggest that the U.S. is a major 
super power and should be awarded special consideration because, as the saying 
goes, with great power comes great responsibility. As a member of the ICC, 
the U.S. could find its hands tied behind its back when issues of international 
peace and security are involved. 20  However others argue that since the U.S. 
is a democratic nation, accountability should be a major objective. The ICC 
would ensure that the U.S. would not only be accountable to itself but to the 
international community as well.21  
 The ICC is independent from the UN, which is a major concern for 
the United States because it cannot fully control the ICC through its powers in 
the Security Council. The Security Council is limited merely to recommending 
attention to a situation in which human rights laws are perhaps violated.  Article 
16, standing as an important adjustment to the statute, declares that no one 
state, not even the five permanent members of the Security Council, may be 
in complete control of ICC proceedings. This act is the resulting compromise 
of the two institutions distinguishing the functions they address. The UN is 
state centered and focuses on the protection of states’ sovereignty, while the 
ICC attempts to implement justice universally and independently of states’ 
influence.22 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE ICC
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 President Clinton did not sign the Rome Statute mainly because of 
the fact that he could not fully control ICC actions in case they conflicted with 
possible U.S. interest. The U.S. believed it could keep its stronghold over 
international justice without having to join the ICC.23 Clinton continued to 
negotiate in order to debate about the terms the U.S. required the statute contain 
to protect in U.S. interests. David Scheffer, the US ambassador at large for war 
crimes issues and head of the US delegation, argued that “the statute had come 
to a point where the U.S. should sign for the greater good of enforcing universal 
norms globally, and that the U.S. had much to gain from joining the court”. 
He also believed that it was necessary to sign the treaty in order “to negotiate 
further Treaty friendly proposals and thus protect American interests while 
pursuing international justice.”24 But on December 31st, 2000, the last day the 
states could sign the statue, Clinton decided to sign the statute. He wanted to 
express U.S.’s “strong support for international accountability and for bringing 
justice to all in the years to come” and to keep U.S. “moral leadership” in years 
to come.25 President Clinton recognized that it was in the U.S. national interest 
to stay engaged with the ICC and be able to take part in future negotiations. And 
hopefully these negotiations would lead to more U.S. friendly policies. But this 
cautious optimism would not last long. 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE ICC
 The Bush administration would be very hostile towards the ICC. 
John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, exemplified the straightforward rejection the Bush administration 
used when dealing with the ICC. He argued that “America’s posture towards 
the ICC should be “Three Noes,” no financial support, directly or indirectly; no 
cooperation; and no further negotiations with other governments to improve the 
ICC.”26  On May 6th 2002, President Bush decided formally to withdraw from 
the Rome treaty and effectively to “unsign” it. Bolton, the most vocal opponent 
of the ICC, maintained that the ICC was “a stealth approach to eroding our 
constitutionalism and undermining the independence and flexibility that our 
military forces need to defend our interests around the world.”27 Thus, the Bush 
administration declared adamantly that it was attempting to move away from 
“multilaterism” and that it understood justice for the victims of human rights 
violations to be a state’s concern, rather than international governance. However, 
by unsigning the treaty the U.S. gave up any chance of being involved in the 
creation of the ICC and the policies it might adopt, as well as use of the ICC 
for their own interest. Several members of Congress sent letters to President 
Bush protesting the unsigning of the treaty saying, “this has damaged the moral 
credibility of the United States and serves as a U.S. repudiation of the notion 
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that war criminals and perpetrators of genocide should be brought to justice.”27 
The letter also pointed out that such “unilateral action may have undesirable 
consequences on multilateral treaty-making and generally on the rule of law in 
international relations.”28  Which it did.
BUSH’S ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE ICC
Resolution 1422 
 The U.S. could not prevent the ICC from becoming more substantial 
and forceful, and the Bush administration therefore tried extensively to 
undermine the operations of the court and exempt nations from its influence.  
In 2002 fearful that its troops would fall under ICC jurisdiction the U.S. 
vetoed a vote to extend the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
threatening a complete withdrawal of its troops invested in the UN security 
force.29 Fortunately, by unanimous vote (despite the criticisms of several non-
voting states) the UN passed Resolution 1422 which exempted from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction for a period of twelve months all peacekeeping personnel.  The 
resolution was then given a further twelve months in 2003,30 and a third attempt 
at renewal only fell apart because U.S. soldiers were being accused of abusing 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the U.S. did not want to bring the 
Security Council into a “prolonged and divisive debate.”30  The U.S. approached 
the UN and expressed that because the resolution was not signed they would 
be forced to pull out funding and personnel from ICC territories. A few days 
later, the Defense Department announced that it would withdraw personnel 
from peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea and also Kosovo because 
they were perceived to be at risk of ICC jurisdiction. Altogether, only nine 
individuals were withdrawn at the time. This was done in order to keep up the 
appearance of ICC defiance but was much less aggressive than the actions taken 
earlier.31  
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) & the American Service-Members 
Protection Act (ASPA)
 Two of the most important measures implemented by the Bush 
administration were Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) and the American 
Service-Members Protection Act. The bilateral Article 98 agreements between 
the U.S. and individual states requires that U.S. personnel and nationals cannot 
be detained, arrested, or sent to the ICC. This was supposed to be used in order 
to make sure U.S. jurisdiction would protect its nationals even if they went 
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into ICC territory. But the Bush administration used this provision to seek 
exemptions from a number of different states, exerting strong diplomatic and 
financial pressure if states did not sign. One hundred and two states have signed 
the BIA’s including 52 ICC member states.32 The European Parliament issued an 
official position in which it not only outlined its opposition to these agreements, 
but also argued, “ratifying such an agreement is incompatible with membership 
of the EU.”33 The Bush administration even signed these agreements into law, 
requiring the U.S. to do whatever is necessary to rescue a U.S. citizen that has 
been taken into custody by the ICC court. 
 As it turns out, the BIAs and the American Service-Members 
Protection Acts (ASPAs) are actually more harmful to the U.S. than helpful. 
Cuts in military assistance to countries that have not signed the BIAs mean lost 
opportunities of military training provided by U.S. troops aimed at strengthening 
U.S. links to other countries, particularly in its fight against terrorism.34 Other 
concerns have arisen because where U.S. military forces were not there to help 
China has taken the opportunity to be present in order to gain influence.35 Even 
Condoleezza Rice admitted that the Article 98 agreements are like “shooting 
ourselves in the foot.”36 By the fall of 2008, the U.S. waived and withdrew 
several restrictions pertaining to the refusal of certain countries to sign BIAs as 
well as all sanction provisions of ASPA.  Admitting that Article 98 restrictions 
had failed, the United States declared that it needed to be done away with “once 
and for all.”37  
OBAMA’S ADMINISTRATION AND THE ICC
Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of State to President Barack Obama, laid out the 
administration’s approach by stating “we will end hostility towards the ICC and 
look for opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways to promote US 
interests by bringing war criminals to justice.” Although the United States is still 
not a member of the ICC there is a shift from Bush’s unilateral approach to a 
multilateral approach. The Obama Administration is committed to collaborating 
with the ICC on such matters as prosecuting leaders of the Ugandan LRA and 
has definitely declared its intent to rejoin the Rome Statute or enlist the Senate to 
ratify the treaty.  
WHAT’S NEXT?
Should the U.S join the ICC?
 The United States should approach the ICC the way the Clinton and 
Obama administrations did: with cautious optimism. In order to keep cordial 
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international relations the U.S. needs to at the very least appear to be considering 
membership into the ICC. But is it in our best interest? No. The U.S. is such 
a major super power and a respected one that it is paramount for the U.S. to 
keep its autonomy. With great power comes great responsibility. The U.S. has 
a responsibility to the rest of the world to be able to process judicial decisions 
without the constraints of an international court. In all honestly, the U.S. court 
system is one of the fairest tribunal institutions. Anyone indicted for a heinous 
crime that would be considered under ICC jurisdiction will have his or her day 
in court on American soil. As for the U.S. heads of state being accountable, 
the U.S. court system does hold them accountable. The additional overlapping 
jurisdiction is not necessary. However, the U.S. needs to stay tuned into the ICC 
and even give the appearance that there is a chance that somewhere down the 
road America will join. This is necessary in order to keep international relations 
pleasant and hopefully sometimes even beneficial. America has already seen 
what happens to international relations if a hostile approach is taken. 
What needs to be done to make the ICC more effective? 
 The first plan of action is to replace the prosecutor Ocampo with a 
prosecutor who can meet the court’s most serious challenges: concluding trials, 
convincing governments to arrest fugitives, conducting credible investigations 
in difficult places such as Libya and Sudan, and expanding the ICC’s reach 
beyond Africa. This may be a great deal to ask for, but the future of the ICC 
depends on it. Outside of the prosecutor’s position there must be an effort to 
gain back confidence of the ICC’s investigators, analysts, and other prosecutors. 
Recruiting and retaining the most highly qualified staff members means 
giving them substantial authority and providing them with guidance, without 
micromanaging them. One way in which to gain credit back from appearing 
as a post Western colonial institution would be to hire an African prosecutor. 
Having an African lead the prosecution over the next decade could help inspire 
domestic and regional efforts at developing accountability and the rule of law by 
demonstrating that international justice is not a norm imposed by the West but 
one shared by a top African jurist.
CONCLUSION
 The objectives of the ICC are noble, but is an international court the 
answer to dissuading anyone from participating in crimes against humanity? 
International justice does not work because every territory has different social 
norms. What one society finds taboo, others find normal. David Easton’s 
accepted definition of political science indicates the important role social values 
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play in judicial practices. Easton defined a political system as “the authoritative 
allocation of values for society as a whole.”33 Yet the international community 
does not have a conformed set of values as a whole. There does seem to be a 
universal understanding about war crimes and extreme crimes against humanity. 
But will it stop there? If the ICC were to gain power and momentum, what 
would stop it from adding more laws to the books? Individual societies should 
be in charge of their own judicial systems because their laws reflect the social 
norms people within that environment are comfortable with. On the other hand, 
if states do want to participate in an international judicial system they should be 
allowed to do so with the U.S.’s blessing. 
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